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Duer: Environmental Law

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY BARS JOINDER OF EPA IN
STATE COURT ACTION

A.

INTRODUCTION

In Aminoil U.S.A., Inc. v. California State Water Resources
Control Board,l the Ninth Circuit held that the California state
courts lack jurisdiction to join the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA)· as a party to an action seeking review of a state
decision to issue a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permit.
Aminoil, an oil and gas well operator located near Santa
Ana, California, discharges drilling wastes into its surrounding
environment. 2 The basis of the dispute between Aminoil and the
State Water Resources Control Board (State Board) was the
proper characterization of this property. If characterized as a
"wetlands'? pursuant to the Clean Water Act4 and its California
counterpart, II Aminoil would have to obtain a NPDES permit
from the State Board to legally discharge wastes.s
In July of 1978, the Fish and Wildlife Service of the United
States Department of the Interior requested that the Santa Ana
Region of the State Board (Regional BoardF declare Aminoil's
1. 674 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Wallace, J.; the other panel members were
Anderson, J. and Jameson, D.J., sitting by designation).
2. [d. at 1230.
3. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1981) defines the term "wetlands" to mean "those areas that
are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally includes
swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas."
4. The "Clean Water Act" refers to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 88 Stat. 816, amended by 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511369 (1978 & Supp. III 1979) and Clean Water Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95213, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977).
5. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13000-13340 (West 1971).
6. 674 F.2d at 1330. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1978).
7. 674 F.2d at 1230. The California State Water Resources Control Board and its

235

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1983

1

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 11

236

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:235

site a 'wetlands" subject to the jurisdiction of the Clean Water
Act. s The Regional Board decided that the area was not a "wetlands", and therefore Aminoil could discharge without a permit. 9
The EPA then sent Aminoil a "finding of violation"l0 of the
Clean Water Act and notified Aminoil and the State Board that
it would take appropriate action if the State Board had not commenced enforcement action within thirty days.ll Following this
notice, the State Board reversed the Regional Board's decision,
finding that Aminoil's property was a "wetlands" and that Aminoil must obtain a NPDES permit. 11
In October of 1979, Aminoil petitioned the California State
Superior Court for a writ of mandamus to review the State
Board's findings. 18 Aminoil joined H the Administrator of the
EPA who promptly removed the action to the federal district
courpa and then filed a motion to dismiss. 18 The district court
nine subsidiary regional boards, responsible for enforcement of the Clean Water Act in
California, were approved by the EPA in 1973. See 39 Fed. Reg. 26,061 (1973).
8. 674 F.2d at 1230.
9. [d. Following this determination, Amigos de Bolsa Chica, an interested environmental organization, petitioned the State Board for review of the Regional Board's decision pursuant to CAL. WATER CODE § 13320 (West Supp. 1982).674 F.2d at 1230.
10. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(l) (1978) provides that "[wlhenever, on the basis of any
information available to him, the Administrator finds that any person is in violation of
any condition or limitation which implements section 1311 ... or 1342 of this title ...
the Administrator shall issue an order requiring such person to comply with such condition or limitation or shall bring a civil action . . . ."
11. 674 F.2d at 1230.
12. [d. This decision was made on the same evidence as that before the Regional
Board.
13. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5 (West 1980) and CAL. WATER CODE § 13330 (West
1978) provides for state court review of the State Board's finding on the "wetlands"
issue.
14. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 389 (West 1973), which permits joinder of an indispensible party to an action, provides:
A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if
(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among
those already parties or (2) he claims an interest relating to
the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition
of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave
any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk
or incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(I) (1976) states: "A civil action commenced in state court
against an officer of the United States acting under color of office or on account of any
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granted the motion, finding that the state court did not have
jurisdiction over the EPA, and Aminoil appealed to the Ninth
Circuit. 17
B.

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

Prior to the passage of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act of 1972, pollution control was the responsibility of the
states. Under the 1965 Federal Water Pollution Control Act,.s
states were allowed to decide the kinds and amounts of pollution
to be permitted, the degree of pollution abatement required, and
the time period within which pollution must end. However, Congress found that the system was less than successful. Five years
after its enactment, some states did not yet have federally approved standards. Time schedules were not being met because of
insufficient enforcement, lack of effluent controls, and disputes
over appropriate water quality standards. IS Congress passed the
Clean Water Act in 1972 as a partial solution to these
problems. lo Five years later, Congress passed the Clean Water
Act of 1977, embodying the belief that to be effective, water pollution control must be based on uniform, national standards
which are adequately enforced.11
The purpose of the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act is to eliminate pollutant discharges into
"navigable waters"l1 of the United States by 1985.18 The vehicle
by which this difficult task is to be accomplished is the NPDES
right, title, or authority claimed under any Act of Congre88 may be removed to federal
district court."
16. The motion was made pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).
17. 674 F.2d 1227, 1231.
18. 33 U.S.C. § 1160 (1970) (amended 1972).
19. S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 2d Se88. 8 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS 3675.
20. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1369 (1978).
21. S. REP. No. 95-370, 95th Cong., 1st Se88. 73 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS 4326, 4398.
22. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 (1981). "Wetlands" are included in the definition of "navigable
waters". The term "navigable waters" as defined in 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(b) (1981) means:
"[those] waters of the United States that are subject to the ebb and .flow of the tide
shoreward to the mean high water mark (mean higher high water mark on the Pacific
coast) and/or are presently used, or have been used in the past, or may be susceptible to
use to transport interstate or foreign commerce." See also 33 C.F.R. § 329 (1981) for
additional information regarding "navigable waters".
23. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1976).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1983

3

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 11

238

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:235

permit program. 2 • Under the program it is unlawful to discharge
a pollutant without a NPDES permit. 211 The Clean Water Act
provides for the EPA Administrator to issue such permits. 26
However, states may issue their own permits under state programs approved by the EPA27 and the EPA must stop issuing
permits once a state program has been approved. 28 The EPA,
however, retains authority to veto particular permits,29 or to
withdraw approval of the entire state program if a state is not
administering it in compliance with the Clean Water Act. sO
24. In addition to providing for the creation of the NPDES permit system, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342 (1978) provides for states to operate EPA approved programs and for the EPA to

suspend its permit issuing program upon approval of a state program. This section also
details the operation of the federal-state relationship in arriving at these permit
decisions.
25. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1978) states: "Except as in compliance with this section ...
the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful."
26. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1978) reads in part: "[T)he Administrator may, after opportunity for public hearing issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant, or combination of pollutants . . . ."
27. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1978) allows a state to submit permit issuing plans for discharges into navigable waters within its jurisdiction. "The Administrator shall approve
each submitted program unless he determines that adequate authority does not exist to
issue permits which apply, and insure compliance with ... [this title)." [d.
It should be noted that while references to the EPA Administrator in the Clean
Water Act are masculine, the EPA Administrator at the time Aminoil was heard, Ann
McGill Gorsuch, is a woman.
28.
Not later than ninety days after the date on which a State has
submitted a program (or revision thereof) pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the Administrator shall suspend the
issuance of permits under subsection (a) of this section as to
those navigable waters subject to such program unless he determines that the state permit program does not meet the requirements of subsection (b) of this section or does not conform to the guidelines issued under section 1314(i)(2) of this
title. If the Administrator so determines, he shall notify the
State of any revisions or modifications necessary to conform to
such regulations or guidelines.
33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(1) (1978).
29. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2) (1978) requires a state to send to the EPA a copy of each
permit application it receives and to notify the EPA of every action related to the application, including any proposed permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2)(B) (1978) provides that no
permit shall issue "if the Administrator within ninety days of the date of transmittal of
the proposed permit by the State objects in writing to the issuance of such permit as
being outside the guidelines and requirements of this chapter."
30. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) (1978) reads:
Whenever the Administrator determines after public hearing
that a State is not administering a program approved under
this section in accordance with requirements of this section, he
shall so notify the State and, if approved corrective action is
not taken within a reasonable time, not to exceed ninety days,
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Although the Clean Water Act provides for access to federal
courts to review EPA decisions to deny NPDES permits,SI it is
silent on the issue of federal review of state agency decisions.
That question was decided by the Ninth Circuit in Shell Oil Co.
v. Train. S2 Shell held that informal EPA recommendations to
the state regional board regarding the issuance of a NPDES permit are not reviewable in federal court. ss The court found that
statutorily sanctioned informal recommendations by the EPA to
the state regional board do not constitute federal action and
therefore would not confer subject matter jurisdiction to the federal court.s. Shell also held that federal review was not compelled by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because EPA
recommendations are not "final" actions. Sli The Ninth Circuit
reasoned that a dissatisfied permit applicant should not be able
to circumvent the appellate process envisioned by the Clean
Water Act and bestow jurisdiction upon a federal court simply
by alleging that the EPA coerced the decision of the state regional board. S8
the Administrator shall withdraw approval of such program.
The Administrator shall not withdraw approval of any such
program unless he shall first have notified the State, and made
public, in writing, the reasons for such withdrawal.
31. See Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 445 U.S. 193 (1980). In that case, the
Director of the EPA's Region IX Enforcement Division objected to the permits proposed
by a regional board. The Court stated: "When EPA. . . objects to effluent limitations
contained in a state-issued permit, the effect of its action is to 'deny' a permit within the
meaning of § 509(b)(I)(O." Id. at 196. Therefore, the Court held that federal courts have
jurisdiction over the matter.
32. 585 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1978). Shell applied for a state NPDES permit for its
Martinez, California industrial complex, claiming that it should be classified as a class D
refinery and as an organic chemical plant. In 1974, the California Regional Board classified the complex as a class E refinery, subjecting it to stricter effluent discharge limits.
Shell filed an application for a variance, which the Regional Board forwarded to the
EPA, pursuant to both the Memorandum of Understanding and federal law. The EPA
recommended that the variance be denied, and the Regional Board ratified the EPA's
recommendation. Shell sought review of the Regional Board decision in federal district
court. Id. at 411.
33. Id. at 414. In Shell, the EPA Administrator did not enter a formal objection to a
proposed permit, but informally controlled the terms of the state permit by compelling
the State Regional Board to reject a request for a variance. Id.

34.Id.
35. The Shell court noted that 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976) provides for federal review of "final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court." 585
F.2d at 414.
36. 585 F.2d at 414. For criticisms of the Shell decision, see Note, Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 - Federal Court Review of EPA Recommendations to State Pollution Control Agency, 64 CORNELL L. REv. 886 (1979); Note,

Jurisdiction to Review Informal EPA Influence Upon State Decisionmaking Under the
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The Clean Water Act specifically provides a means for the
EP A to take independent enforcement action in the federal
courts. 37 This provision, combined with the Shell decision,
leaves permit applicants dissatisfied with a state decision in a
difficult position. Applicants can seek review of a State Board
decision only in state court;38 however, even if a favorable judgment is received there, they may be faced with defending against
an independent EPA enforcement action brought in federal
court. In such situations, applicants have argued that the EPA
should be collaterally estopped to relitigate in federal court issues decided in a state court action. In United States v. ITT
Rayonier,38 the Ninth Circuit held that the EPA was collaterally
estopped· o from relitigating a permit issue previously deterFederal Water Pollution Control Act: Shell Oil v. Train, 92 HARv. L. REV. 1814 (1979).
Judge Wallace dissented in Shell, believing the issue was whether a decision, announced by the California Regional Water Quality Board, but in fact made informally by
the EPA, was reviewable in federal court. Judge Wallace premised his dissent on State of
Washington v. Environmental Protection Agency (Scott Paper), 573 F.2d 583 (9th Cir.
1978), which held that an EPA veto of a proposed state permit was reviewable in federal
court. The dissent concluded that there was no substantive difference between the EPA
action in Scott Paper, where the Administrator formally vetoed the state permit after a
state decision had been made, and Shell, where the EPA's decision was made without
benefit of an initial state decision. Therefore, the federal court had jurisdiction to review
the permit decision. 585 F.2d at 418.
37. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1976) provides:
The Administrator is authorized to commence a civil action
for appropriate relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction, for any violation for which he is authorized to issue a
compliance order under subsection (a) of this section. Any action under this subsection may be brought in the district court
of the United States for the district in which the defendant is
located or resides or is doing business, and such court shall
have jurisdiction to restrain such violation and to require compliance. Notice of the commencement of such action shall be
given immediately to the appropriate State.
38. CAL. WATER CODE § 13330(a) (West 1980) states: "Within 30 days after service
of a copy of a decision and order issued by the state board. . . any aggrieved party may
file with the superior court a petition for a writ of mandate for review thereof .... "
39. 627 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1980). The dispute centered on the meaning of a footnote
to a state issued NPDES permit. ITT Rayonier received a favorable judgment from
Washington State Superior Court and the EPA filed its own enforcement action in federal court under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1976) seeking injunctive relief and civil penalties.
40. Collateral estoppel operates so that "[o)nce an issue is actually litigated and
necessarily determined, that determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a
different cause of action but involving a party or one privy to the prior litigation". 627
F.2d 996, 1000; See generally Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
In Rayonier, the court noted that "privy may include those whose interests are represented by one with authority to do so." 627 F.2d at 1003. See generally Ma Chuck
Moon v. Dulles, 237 F.2d 241, 243 (9th Cir. 1956). In Rayonier, the Ninth Circuit deter-
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mined by a Washington State Court. However, in a subsequent
case, Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm.,41 the Ninth Circuit found that a federal agency was
not bound by a Washington State Court's definition of "navigable waters" when it sought to relitigate the question in federal
court.
C.

THE COURT'S REASONING

The issue in Shell was whether a decision, influenced by the
EPA but made by a California Regional Board, was reviewable
in a federal court. The Ninth Circuit held that it was not, because the EPA had not yet taken final action and the issue could
be adequately reviewed in a state court.42 Aminoil presented the
corollary issue of whether a state court has jurisdiction to join
the EPA as a party in an action to review a state agency's independent determination. 48 Although the action was removed to
federal court, the Ninth Circuit focused on whether the state
court had jurisdiction, because removal jurisdiction is entirely
derivative of original state court jurisdiction.44 The Ninth Circuit concluded that although California courts are courts of general jurisdiction, the doctrine of sovereign immunity prohibits
them from joining the EPA. 411
Aminoil advanced several reasons why sovereign immunity
should not prohibit it from joining the EPA in state court. First,
Aminoil argued that the AP A waives sovereign immunity for
mined that the Washington Department of Ecology and the EPA were privy because the
interests of the Department an,d the EPA were identical and their involvement sufficiently similar. 627 F.2d at 1000.
41. 644 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1981). In 1913, the Washington State Supreme Court decided that the White River was not "navigable". See Sumner Lumber & Shingle Co. v.
Pacific Coast Power Co., 72 Wash. 631, 131 P. 220 (1913). The Ninth Circuit found that
it was not bound by this determination because the test employed in Sumner differed
from the standard of what constitutes "navigability under federal law." 644 F.2d at 788.
42. 585 F.2d 408, 414. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
43. 674 F.2d 1227, 1229.
44. In Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 389 (1939), the Supreme Court
held that removal jurisdiction is entirely derivative of original state court jurisdiction. If
the state court did not have jurisdiction, the federal court will not have jurisdiction on
removal, even if it would have had jurisdiction had the action commenced in federal
court.
45. 674 F.2d 1227, 1233. Sovereign immunity bars suit against an officer of the federal government unless the United States has waived its immunity by consent or the
officer has exceeded the scope of his or her statutory authority. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S.
609 (1963).
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non-monetary suits against the government. 46 The court dismissed this contention because this waiver applies only to actions brought "in a court of the United States."47 Since Aminoil's action was commenced in state court, and since the AP A
limits waiver to suits commenced in federal court, the Ninth
Circuit found that the AP A could not be invoked as a basis for
finding a waiver of sovereign immunity.48
Aminoil next claimed that because the Administrator had
incorrectly classified the property as a "wetlands", her actions
exceeded her statutory authority and therefore were unprotected
by sovereign immunity.49 Aminoil relied on Larson u. Foreign &
Domestic Commerce Corp.oo for the proposition that where an
officer's powers are limited by statute, actions beyond those limitations are individual, not sovereign, actions. The Ninth Circuit
found that Larson did not apply because the key question in
that case was "whether relief sought in a suit nominally addressed to the officer is relief against the sovereign. "01 The court
noted that the relief sought by Aminoil was clearly against the
sovereign because the Clean Water Act authorized the Administrator to issue a "finding of violation." The court observed that a
simple mistake of fact or law does not necessarily mean that an
officer of the government has exceeded his or her scope of
authority. all
The court next analyzed the question of whether consent to
46. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976) provides in part:
An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other
than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an
officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official
capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismi88ed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is
against the United States or that the United States is an indispensible party.
47. 674 F.2d at 1233. See supra note 46.
48. The court relied on the legislative history of the AP A, which states in part: "The
consent to suit is also limited to claims in the courts of the United States; hence the
United States remains immune from suit in state courts." H.R. REP. No. 1656, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 6121, 6131.
49. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1) (1978). See supra note 10 for the text of this statute.
50. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
51. 674 F.2d 1227, 1234, quoting Larson, 337 U.S. at 687.
52. 674 F.2d at 1234. In Larson, the Court held that "if the actions of an officer do
not conflict with the terms of his valid statutory authority, then they are the actions of
the sovereign . . . ." 337 U.S. at 695.
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suit could be based on the Clean Water Act's dual enforcement
scheme. liS Aminoil relied on United States v. Hellard ll4 to support its position that consent to suit is implied where a state
court has jurisdiction to decide a matter in which a federal
agency has an interest. However, the court distinguished Hellard, noting that the statute in question there contained two significant provisions: (1) the United States would be bound by
state court judgments, and, (2) the United States must be given
an opportunity to appear in state court actions.1I1I The court indicated that had the Clean Water Act included similar provisions,
Aminoil's argument might have succeeded. 1I8
The court refused to imply a congressional waiver of sovereign immunity, because the Clean Water Act's structure evidenced a congressional intent to preclude the exercise of state
court jurisdiction over the EPA or the Administrator.1I7 The
court stated that the Clean Water Act's "allocation of dual enforcement authority to state and federal agencies suggests a similar allocation of judicial authority, confining review of formal
EPA action to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. "118
The Ninth Circuit found that its holding was compelled by
an analysis of the jurisdiction issue, as well as by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. The Clean Water Act provides for federal
jurisdiction over review of allegedly improper EPA action. 1I9 The
court emphasized that although no provision of the Clean Water
Act states that the remedies specified are exclusive, in a scheme
as detailed as that of the Clean Water Act, the remedies are presumed to be exclusive absent evidence of contrary legislative intent. 80 Examining the legislative history of the Clean Water Act,
the court found no evidence that Congress intended to provide
remedies not articulated in the Act itself; rather, Congress in53. 33 U.S.C. 1342(a), (b) (1978). See supra notes 26, 27.
54. 322 U.S. 363 (1944). In Hellard, the Court found implied consent to suit in state
court from an act of Congress which subjected United States land (Indian property) to
state law.
55. [d. at 364.
56. 674 F.2d 1227, 1234.
57. [d. at 1235.
58. [d.
59. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(l) (1978).
60. 674 F.2d at 1235. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Aas'n of R.R.
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974).
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tended to preclude state jurisdiction over the EPA or Administrator.81 This finding was based on the EPA's statutory right to
intervene in a "citizen suit" filed in a district court and the lack
of any such right to intervene in a state court action. 8D The court
also acknowledged Aminoil's argument that it may remain subject to independent and potentially conflicting federal authority,
but stated that allowing joinder of the EPA in state court would
sharply conflict with the EPA's authority to supervise state permit programs under the Clean Water Act. 88
Having concluded that the EPA cannot be joined in a state
court action seeking review of the State Board's decision, the
court next considered whether, if Aminoil successfully litigated
the "wetlands" issue in state court, the doctrine of collateral estoppel would preclude the EPA from instituting an independent
enforcement action in federal court.8. Previously, the Ninth Circuit had held, in United States v. ITT Rayonier, that the EPA
was collaterally estopped from bringing an independent enforcement action. 811 However, the Aminoil court found that the instant case did not fall within the scope of Rayonier. Rather, the
court relied on Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm. 88 to assert that since there are situations
in which the "wetlands" issue cannot be finally determined by a
state court, the EPA would not be collaterally estopped to relitigate this issue. 87
61. 674 F.2d at 1235.
62. 33 U.S.C. 1365(c)(2) (1976).
63. 674 F.2d at 1235.
64. [d. at 1236. It is well established that "[i)f a state court and a federal court have
concurrent jurisdiction over a cause of action, a judgment in either court will usually
have complete res judicata effect in the other" and that different agencies of the United
States government are in privity for collateral estoppel purposes. See Note, Res Judicata: Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction and the Effect of Prior State Court Determiantiona, 53 VA. L. REV. 1360, 1363 n.16 (1967). See also Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v.
Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402-03 (1940). In addition, the United States can be prevented
from pursuing an action which has been litigated by a party representing its interests.
See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 153 (1979). The State Board can generally be
presumed to represent the EPA's interests when litigating in the state court, since the
EPA could cure any state board finding with which it disagrees prior to state court review by vetoing the state permit and defending its veto in federal court. However, collateral estoppel might not apply where state and federal courts employ different standards
of review. See Note, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1814, supra note 36, at 1822 n.58.
65. 627 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1980). See supra note 39.
66. 644 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1981).
67. 674 F.2d at 1237.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol13/iss1/11

10

Duer: Environmental Law

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

1983]

245

The court concluded that even if the EPA could be collaterally estopped in a subsequent enforcement action, it did not necessarily follow that the EPA could be joined in a state court action, since the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the Clean
Water Act's allocation of jurisdiction precludes the states from
exercising jurisdiction over the EPA. 66 The court emphasized
that although its holding may not comport well with traditional
notions of judicial economy, it is mandated by the scheme of
cooperative federalism embodied in the Clean Water Act to
"recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities
and rights of the States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution,"69 while insuring that water pollution control is uniform
and adequately enforced. 70

D.

SIGNIFICANCE

Although the Ninth Circuit in reaching its conclusion relied
primarily on its prior decision in Shell, the result in AmiilOil is
not entirely consistent with Shell. One of the predicates of the
Shell decision to preclude federal review of informal EPA action
was that adequate relief was available in state court.7l However,
state court review would be inadequate in Aminoil, because a
favorable state court judgment would still be subject to attack
by the EPA in an independent enforcement action brought in
federal court. It is difficult to maintain that state court review is
adequate if it does not provide a final resolution of the issue.
Although the court in Aminoil did not address this apparent inconsistency with Shell, it did note that to hold otherwise would
sharply conflict with the EPA's independent authority to supervise state permit programs under the Clean Water Act.72 The
necessity for preserving the authority of sanctioned EPA enforcement power was the underlying force which compelled the
Ninth Circuit to find that the EPA may not be joined in a state
court action seeking review of a state agency decision, and not
be collaterally estopped by a prior state court judgment.
Although the court's reasoning on the issue of sovereign im68.Id.
69. 33 U.S.c. § 125I(b) (1978 & Supp. IV 1980).
70. 674 F.2d at 1237.
7t." 585 F.2d 408, 414. See supra note 35.
72. 674 F.2d at 1235.
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munity is adequately based, both on interpretation of statute
and application of precedent, its refusal to find that the EPA
would be collaterally estopped is questionable. Although the
court relied on Puget Sound 73 in holding that the EPA would
not be collaterally estopped from relitigating the wetlands issue
in an independent enforcement action, Puget Sound is distinguishable in that the definition which the federal agency sought
to apply in that case differed from the definition applied in the
earlier state court case. In the dispute in Aminoil, the definition
used to determine if the property was a wetlands, and therefore
a "navigable water" within the meaning of the Clean Water Act,
was identical in state and federal court because. California had
expressly adopted the federal definition.H However, the court
also avoided finding that Rayonier would be binding precedent
because the court in Rayonier stated that its decision "may be
sui generis. ''71'> The Rayonier decision has yet to be subsequently
applied to collaterally estop the EPA.
The Ninth Circuit decision in Aminoil supports the independent enforcement authority of the EPA by preserving its
ability to avoid state court jurisdiction and possible usurpation
of EPA power to review state agency decisions. Also, the EPA
retains the ability to attack state court judgments on NPDES
permit issues by filing a civil suit in federal court to enforce the
Clean Water Act. 78 There are sound policy reasons for maintaining unfettered EPA enforcement authority on an individual permit basis, without resorting to the more drastic step of revoking
approval of an entire state program. To allow the EPA to be
bound by a state court decision in such an action might effectively destroy the EPA's independent enforcement power created by the Clean Water Act. 77 The legislative history of the
Clean Water Act provides an insight into why this EPA power is
80 important:
EPA has been much too hesitant to take any actions where States have approved permit pro73. 644 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1981). See supra note 45.
74. CAL. WATER CODE § 13373 (West Supp. 1982) states that the term" 'navigable
waters' ... shall have the same meaning as in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
and acts amendatory thereof or supplementary thereto."
75. 627 F.2d at 1004.
76. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1978)
77. [d.
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grams. The result might well be the creation of
"pollution havens" in some of those States which
have approved permit programs. This result is exactly what the 1972 amendments were designed to
avoid. Lack of a strong EPA oversight of State
programs is neither fair to industry nor to 'States
that are vigorously pursuing the act's requirements. The committee is concerned that the
Agency is not conducting a vigorous overview of
State programs to assure uniformity and consistency of permit requirements and of the enforcement of violations of permit conditions. 78

It is also important to consider that since water does not
respect political boundaries, there is a national interest in uniform enforcement of the Clean Water Act. Uniform enforcement
can be assured only if the EPA has final, supervisory authority
over states in the operation of their permit programs. It would
be unfair to those states which may discourage industry by
strictly enforcing the Clean Water Act to be defeated in their
pollution control efforts by having polluted water flowing in
from other, less circumspect states. In addition, states with
stricter enforcement programs would be at an economic disadvantage vis-a-vis states which make it possible for industry to
pollute with impunity.

Although the Ninth Circuit did not articulate a balancing
process, it appears to have weighed the importance of congressionally mandated uniform standards of water quality control
against the need for judicial economy and expedient resolution
of permit issues. The court indicated that its decision may not
comport well with traditional notions of judicial economy because a permit applicant may have to litigate an issue twice, but
indicated that this is a problem which the legislature must
correct.79
In practice, the Aminoil decision may not mean that an applicant will always be subject to multiple litigation. The court
noted that an applicant might seek a declaratory judgment from
federal district court, proceeding against the EPA and joining
78. S. REP. No. 217, 97d Cong., 1st Se88. 73 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE
& AD. NEWS 4326, 4398.
79. 674 F.2d 1227, 1337.
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the State Board in the action. so Although the court did not provide guidelines as to when declaratory relief is appropriate, this
avenue may alleviate the problem of multiple litigation.
Donna D. Duer*

SO. rd. at 1237 n.10.
• Second year student, Golden Gate University School of Law.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol13/iss1/11

14

